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RESPONDENTS
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly
Yasui—the children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon
Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui—come forward as
amici curiae because they see the disturbing
relevance of this Court’s decisions in their fathers’
This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no person or entity other than amici curiae made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the brief’s preparation or
submission.
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infamous cases challenging the mass removal and
incarceration of Japanese Americans during World
War II to the serious questions raised by Presidential
Proclamation No. 9645.
Minoru Yasui was a 25-year-old attorney in
Portland, Oregon, when, on March 28, 1942, he
intentionally defied the government’s first actionable
order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese
ancestry in order to challenge the order’s
constitutionality. Gordon Hirabayashi was a 24year-old college senior in Seattle, Washington, when,
on May 16, 1942, he similarly chose to defy the
government’s curfew and removal orders.
Fred
Korematsu was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland,
California, when, on May 30, 1942, he was arrested
for refusing to report for removal.
All three men brought their constitutional
challenges to this Court.
Deferring to the
government’s claim that the orders were justified by
military necessity, the Court affirmed their
convictions. Our Nation has since recognized that
the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese
Americans was wrong; the three cases have been
widely condemned; and all three men have been
recognized with the Presidential Medal of Freedom
for their wartime courage and lifetime work
advancing civil and human rights.
Their children have sought to carry forward
their fathers’ legacy by educating the public and, as
appropriate, reminding the courts of the human toll
and constitutional harms wrought by governmental
actions, carried out in the name of national security,
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that impact men, women, and children belonging to
disfavored minority groups. Guilt, loyalty, and threat
are individual attributes. Courts must be vigilant
when these attributes are imputed to entire racial,
religious, and/or ethnic groups. The Hirabayashi,
Yasui, and Korematsu cases stand as important
reminders of the need for courts—and especially this
Court—to fulfill their essential role in our democracy
by checking unfounded exercises of executive power.
The Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui
families are proud to stand with the following public
interest organizations:
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality (“Korematsu Center”) is based at the Seattle
University School of Law. Inspired by the legacy of
Fred Korematsu, the Korematsu Center works to
advance justice for all through research, advocacy,
and education. The Korematsu Center has a special
interest in addressing government action targeting
classes of persons based on race, nationality, or
religion and in seeking to ensure that courts
understand the historical—and, at times, unjust—
underpinnings of arguments asserted to support the
exercise of such executive power. The Korematsu
Center does not, here or otherwise, represent the
official views of Seattle University.
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (“Advancing
Justice”) is the national affiliation of five nonpartisan
civil rights organizations whose offices are located in
Washington D.C. (AAJC), San Francisco (Asian Law
Caucus), Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles. Through
direct services, impact litigation, amicus briefs, policy
advocacy, leadership development, and capacity
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building, the Advancing Justice affiliates advocate for
marginalized members of the Asian American, Native
Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, and other underserved
communities, including immigrant members of those
communities.
The Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (“AALDEF”), founded in 1974, is a
national organization that protects and promotes the
civil rights of Asian Americans.
By combining
litigation, advocacy, education, and organizing,
AALDEF works with Asian American communities
nationwide to secure human rights for all. In 1982,
AALDEF supported reparations for Japanese
Americans forcibly relocated and imprisoned during
World War II. After 9/11, AALDEF represented more
than 800 individuals from Muslim-majority countries
who were called in to report to immigration
authorities under the Special Registration program.
AALDEF is currently providing community education
and legal counseling to Asian Americans affected by
the challenged Presidential Proclamation.
The Hispanic National Bar Association
(“HNBA”) comprises thousands of Latino lawyers,
law professors, law students, legal professionals,
state and federal judges, legislators, and bar
affiliates across the country.
The HNBA is
committed to advocacy on issues of importance,
including immigration and protection of refugees, to
the 53 million people of Hispanic heritage living in
the United States.
The Japanese American Citizens League of
Hawaii, Honolulu Chapter (“JACL Honolulu”) draws
upon Hawaii’s rich, multiethnic society and strong
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cultural values, but broadly focuses on addressing
discrimination and intolerance towards all people
victimized by injustice and prejudice.
JACL
Honolulu supported redress for Japanese Americans
incarcerated during World War II and sponsors
annual events to educate the public regarding that
unjust incarceration, one of the core reasons for the
founding of the JACL Honolulu chapter.
LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc. (“LatinoJustice”) is
a national civil rights legal defense fund that has
defended the constitutional rights and equal
protection of all Latinos under the law.
LatinoJustice’s continuing mission is to promote the
civic participation of the greater pan-Latino
community in the United States, to cultivate Latino
community leaders, and to engage in and support law
reform litigation across the country addressing
criminal justice, education, employment, fair
housing, immigrants’ rights, language rights,
redistricting, and voting rights. During its 45-year
history, LatinoJustice has litigated numerous cases
in both state and federal courts challenging
governmental racial discrimination.
The National Bar Association (“NBA”) is the
largest and oldest association of predominantly
African-American attorneys and judges in the United
States. Founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000
African-American attorneys nationwide and when
other national bar associations, such as the ABA, did
not admit African-American attorneys, the NBA
today has a membership of approximately 66,000
lawyers, judges, law professors and law students, and
has over 75 affiliate chapters.
Throughout its
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history, the NBA consistently has advocated on
behalf of African Americans and other minority
populations regarding issues affecting the legal
profession.
The South Asian Bar Association of North
America (“SABA”) is the umbrella organization for 26
regional bar associations in North America
representing the interests of over 6,000 attorneys of
South Asian descent. Providing a vital link for the
South Asian community to the law and legal system,
SABA takes an active interest in the legal rights of
South Asian and other minority communities.
Members of SABA include immigration lawyers and
others who represent persons that have been and will
be affected by the Presidential Proclamation.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT
“Often the question has been raised whether this
country could wage a new war without the loss of its
fundamental liberties at home. Here is one occasion
for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that
question and show the world that we can fight for
democracy and preserve it too.”
Gordon Hirabayashi made that plea to the Court
in 1943, as he appealed his conviction for violating
military orders issued three months after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Authorized by
Executive Order No. 9066, those orders led to the
forced removal and incarceration of over 120,000
men, women, and children of Japanese descent living
on the West Coast.
Mr. Hirabayashi did not stand alone before this
Court. Minoru Yasui likewise invoked our Nation’s
ideals in casting his separate but related appeal as
“the case of all whose parents came to our shores for
a haven of refuge” and insisting that the country
should respond to war and strife “in the American
way and not by *** acts of injustice.” Appellant Br.
55-56, Yasui v. United States, No. 871 (U.S. Apr. 30,
1943). The Court denied the appeals of both men.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
The following year, this Court revisited the mass
removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In
Korematsu, the Court again failed to stand as a
bulwark
against
governmental
action
that
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undermines core constitutional principles.
By
refusing to scrutinize the government’s claim that its
abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans was
justified by military necessity, the Court enabled the
government to cover its racially discriminatory
policies in the cloak of national security.
In this case, the Court is once again asked to
abdicate its critical role in safeguarding fundamental
freedoms.
Invoking national security, the
government seeks near complete deference to the
President’s decision to deny indefinitely all
immigrant and most non-immigrant visas to
nationals of six Muslim-majority countries.
See
Proclamation 9645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities
and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into
the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017)
(“Presidential Proclamation”).
The government claims it is merely asking for
the application of established legal principles, but the
extreme deference it seeks is not rooted in sound
constitutional tradition. Rather, it rests on doctrinal
tenets infected with long-repudiated racial and
nativist precepts.
In support of the sweeping
proposition that the President’s authority to exclude
aliens is unbounded, the government previously
invoked the so-called “plenary power” doctrine—that
doctrine derives from decisions such as Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), which
relied on pejorative racial stereotypes to eschew
judicial scrutiny in upholding a law that prohibited
Chinese laborers from returning to the United States
after travel abroad. Id. at 595.
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Although no longer using the term “plenary
power,” the government continues to assert that “any
policy toward aliens”—including a decision to exclude
an entire class of individuals based on religion and
national origin—is “so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Gov’t
Br. 23 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 588-589 (1952)). As the Ninth Circuit observed,
the numbing judicial passivity the government
demands “runs contrary to the fundamental
structure of our constitutional democracy” in which
“it is the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a
duty that will sometimes require the ‘[r]esolution of
litigation challenging the constitutional authority of
one of the three branches.’” Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in
original) (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
Even more than the early “plenary power”
decisions, the shades of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and
Yasui lurking in the government’s argument should
give this Court pause.
In those cases, the
government’s policies were ostensibly backed by the
controversial “Final Report” issued by Lieutenant
General John L. DeWitt, the military commander
who ordered the mass removal and incarceration of
Japanese Americans on the West Coast. By the time
it was finally presented to this Court, the Final
Report—which history revealed to be riddled with
falsehoods about the national security threat posed
by Japanese Americans—had been materially altered
to hide the racist motivations of its author.
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Here, another report, this time from the
Secretary of Homeland Security, purports to justify
the President’s decision to exclude classes of
individuals based on nationality and religion—only
this time, the government has resisted allowing even
the courts to review the report. See Letter to Patricia
S. Connor, Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, from Sharon Swingle,
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants, re: IRAP v.
Trump, No. 17-2231 (Nov. 24, 2017) (“Fourth Circuit
Letter”). That fact alone should raise alarms.
Regrettably, however, hidden and suspect
government reports are far from the only similarity
between this case and Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and
Yasui. As here, in those cases, the government
denied that its policies were grounded in “invidious
*** discrimination” and asked the Court to take it at
its word that “the security of the nation” justified
blanket action against an “entire group *** at once.”
Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 870
(U.S. May 8, 1943). In its now infamous decisions,
this Court agreed.
In Hirabayashi, the Court concluded that even
though racial distinctions are “odious to a free
people,” it could not “reject as unfounded the
[government’s] judgment” that the measures taken
against Japanese Americans were necessary.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99-100. Going further in
Korematsu, the Court denied that race played any
role in the government’s decisions: “Cast[ing] this
case into outlines of racial prejudice,” the Court
opined, “without reference to the real military
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the
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issue.” 323 U.S. at 223. Accepting the government’s
assurance, the Court went on to find that “Korematsu
was not excluded from the [West Coast] because of
hostility to him or his race[,] [h]e was excluded
because *** the properly constituted military
authorities *** decided that the military urgency of
the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated *** temporarily.” Id.
Not all members of the Court were convinced,
however. Three Justices dissented, including Justice
Murphy, who declared that the exclusion of Japanese
Americans “falls into the ugly abyss of racism,”
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, and Justice Jackson,
who pointed out that the Court “had no real evidence”
to support the government’s assertions of military
necessity. Moreover, Justice Jackson warned, the
Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id. at 246.
As history has made us acutely aware, the
dissenters’ doubts as to the veracity of the
government’s assertion of military necessity were
well-founded, and their recognition of the gravity of
the Court’s decision was prophetic. Four decades
after the Court upheld their convictions, Gordon
Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu
successfully sought to have them vacated in
unprecedented coram nobis proceedings. Evidence
presented in those cases showed that the “military
urgency” on which this Court predicated its decision
(and the purported justification asserted in General
DeWitt’s Final Report) was nothing more than a
smokescreen: The real reason for the government’s
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deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans was not
acts of espionage, but rather a baseless perception of
disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes.
With the benefit of hindsight, Korematsu (and
by inference Hirabayashi and Yasui) “stands as a
constant caution that in times of war or declared
military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in
protecting constitutional guarantees” and “national
security must not be used to protect governmental
actions from close scrutiny and accountability.”
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420
(N.D. Cal. 1984). Put simply, those cases “illustrate[]
that it can be highly destructive of civil liberties to
understand the Constitution as giving the President
a blank check.” STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND
THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL
REALITIES 84 (2015).
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are as
wrong today as they were on the day they were
decided.
If it were to accept the government’s
invitation here to abdicate its judicial responsibility,
the Court would repeat its failures in those widely
condemned cases. The Court should instead take this
opportunity to acknowledge the historic wrong in
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, and to repudiate
its refusal to scrutinize the government’s claim of
necessity and its consequent failure to recognize the
military orders’ racist underpinnings. Heeding the
lessons of history, the Court should subject the
President’s decision to meaningful judicial scrutiny
and affirm the Founders’ visionary principle that an
independent and vigilant judiciary is a foundational
element of a healthy democracy.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCEPTION OF
PLENARY
POWER
DERIVES
FROM
CASES INFECTED WITH RACIST AND
XENOPHOBIC PREJUDICES.

In defending the first Executive Order that
sought to exclude aliens from Muslim-majority
countries, the government argued that “political
branches[] [have] plenary constitutional authority
over foreign affairs, national security, and
immigration.”
Gov’t Emergency Mot. 15-16,
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4,
2017). In light of that “plenary authority,” the
government asserted, “[j]udicial second-guessing of
the President’s determination that a temporary
suspension of entry of certain classes of aliens was
necessary *** to protect national security ***
constitute[s] an impermissible intrusion.” Id. at 15.
Despite shedding the “plenary power” label, the
government’s central argument remains unchanged:
The political branches’ “power to *** exclude aliens”
is “largely immune from judicial control.” Gov’t Br. 18
(ellipsis in original) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977)). This Court, however, has never
recognized an unbridled “plenary” power in the
immigration realm that would preclude judicial
review. And to the extent that it has shown excessive
deference to the political branches in some cases,
those precedents are linked to racist attitudes from a
past era that have long since fallen out of favor.
1. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, known
as The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a
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statute barring the return of Chinese laborers who
had departed the United States prior to its passage.
130 U.S. at 581-582.
Describing the reasons
underlying the law’s enactment, the Court
characterized Chinese laborers as “content with the
simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our
laborers and artisans,” and observed that they
remained “strangers in the land, residing apart by
themselves, *** adhering to the customs and usages
of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with
our people.” Id. at 595. “The differences of race
added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.” Id.
Residents of the West Coast, the Court explained,
warned of an “Oriental invasion” and “saw or
believed they saw *** great danger that at no distant
day *** [the West] would be overrun by them, unless
prompt action was taken to restrict their
immigration.” Id.
Far from applying a skeptical eye to the law in
light of the clear animus motivating its passage, the
Court found that “[i]f *** the government of the
United States, through its legislative department,
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race
in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be
dangerous to its peace and security *** its
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.” The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606; see also
Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the
Chinese Exclusion Cases:
The “Plenary Power”
Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights,
10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 15 (2003). In reality, the “right of
self-preservation” that the Court validated as
justification for the government’s unbounded power
to exclude immigrants was ethnic and racial self-
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preservation, not the preservation of borders or
national security. 130 U.S. at 608; see id. at 606 (“It
matters not in what form *** aggression and
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation
acting in its national character, or from vast hordes
of its people crowding in upon us.”).
Similar racist and xenophobic attitudes are
evident in decisions following The Chinese Exclusion
Case. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement that
Chinese resident aliens offer “at least one credible
white witness” in order to remain in the country); id.
at 730 (noting Congress’s belief that testimony from
Chinese witnesses could not be credited because of
“the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the
obligation of an oath” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).
2. Even in its early plenary power decisions,
however, the Court recognized that the government’s
sovereign authority is subject to constitutional
limitations. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. at 604 (“[S]overeign powers *** [are] restricted
in their exercise only by the constitution itself and
considerations of public policy and justice which
control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized
nations.”). Indeed, from the doctrine’s inception, the
Court divided over the reach of the government’s
power in light of those limitations.
Fong Yue Ting, which upheld a law requiring
Chinese laborers residing in the United States to
obtain a special certificate of residence to avoid
deportation, generated three dissenting opinions. See
149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I deny that
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there is any arbitrary and unrestrained power to
banish residents, even resident aliens.”); id. at 744
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, J.,
dissenting). Even Justice Field, who authored the
Court’s opinion in The Chinese Exclusion Case,
sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s
application with regard to alien residents:
As men having our common humanity, they
are protected by all the guaranties of the
constitution. To hold that they are subject
to any different law, or are less protected in
any particular, than other persons, is *** to
ignore the teachings of our history *** and
the language of our constitution.
Id. at 754.
Nearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism
regarding an unrestrained plenary power persisted—
and proliferated. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952), the Court, relying on Korematsu (see
note 2, infra), upheld a provision permitting the
deportation of resident aliens who were members of
the Communist Party. In dissent, Justice Douglas
quoted Justice Brewer’s words in Fong Yue Ting,
observing that they “grow[] in power with the passing
years”:
This doctrine of powers inherent in
sovereignty is one both indefinite and
dangerous. *** The governments of other
nations have elastic powers. Ours are fixed
and bounded by a written constitution. The
expulsion of a race may be within the
inherent powers of a despotism. History,
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before the adoption of this constitution, was
not destitute of examples of the exercise of
such a power; and its framers were familiar
with history, and wisely, as it seems to me,
they gave to this government no general
power to banish.
Id. at 599-600.
In another McCarthy-era precedent, four
Justices advocated for limitations on the plenary
power doctrine. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the Court rejected
any constitutional challenge to the exclusion of an
alien who had previously resided in the United
States, despite his resulting indefinite detention at
Ellis Island. In dissent, Justice Black, joined by
Justice Douglas, reasoned that “[n]o society is free
where government makes one person’s liberty depend
upon the arbitrary will of another.” Id. at 217.
“Dictatorships,” he observed, “have done this since
time immemorial. They do now.” Id. Justice
Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added that
such aliens must be “accorded procedural due process
of law.” Id. at 224.
3. Perhaps reflecting the shift away from the
xenophobic
and
race-based
characterizations
prevalent in its early plenary power precedents, the
Court in recent years has been more willing to
enforce
constitutional
limitations
on
the
government’s authority over immigration matters.
In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), for
example, the Court held that INS regulations must at
least
“rationally
advanc[e]
some
legitimate
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governmental purpose.” Id. at 306. In Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), the Court affirmed
that a resident alien returning from a brief trip
abroad must be afforded due process in an exclusion
proceeding. Id. at 33. And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001), in response to the government’s
contention that “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to
create immigration law, and *** the Judicial Branch
must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch
decisionmaking in that area,” the Court observed
that such “power is subject to important
constitutional limitations.”
Id. at 695 (citations
omitted). “[F]ocus[ing] upon those limitations,” id.,
the Court determined that the indefinite detention of
aliens deemed removable would raise “serious
constitutional concerns” and accordingly construed
the statute at issue to avoid those problems, id. at
682. See generally Washington, 847 F.3d at 11621163 (collecting cases demonstrating reviewability of
federal government action in immigration and
national security matters).
The Court’s most recent decision in this area
provides further support for the conclusion that, after
more than a century of erosion, the notion of plenary
power over immigration is little more than a relic.
In Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), this
Court considered a due process claim arising from the
denial without adequate explanation of a spouse’s
visa application. Although it described the power of
the political branches over immigration as “plenary,”
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Din made
clear that courts may review an exercise of that
power.
Id. at 2139-2140.
Justice Kennedy
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acknowledged that the Court in Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined to balance
the constitutional rights of American citizens injured
by a visa denial against “Congress’ ‘plenary power to
make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude
those who possess those characteristics which
Congress has forbidden.’” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139
(quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766). But he explained
that the Court did inquire “whether the Government
had provided a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’
reason for its action.” Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel,
408 U.S. at 770). And while as a general matter
courts are not to “look behind” the government’s
asserted reason, courts should do so if the challenger
has made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” Id.
at 2141.
To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din
acknowledged that the political branches are entitled
to wide latitude and deference in immigration
matters. For that reason, the government relies
heavily on Din and Mandel to argue that its assertion
of a national security rationale is sufficient to justify
the Presidential Proclamation and to preclude
further judicial scrutiny. See Gov’t Br. at 58-64. But,
as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, Din (and Mandel
before it) concerned an individual visa denial on the
facts of that case. Washington, 847 F.3d at 11631164.
By contrast, the Proclamation sets a
nationwide immigration policy of denying all
immigrant and most non-immigrant visas to aliens of
certain nationalities. While it may be sensible for
courts ordinarily to defer to the judgment of the
political branches when considering the application of
immigration law to a particular alien, the President’s
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decision to issue a broadly applicable immigration
policy—especially one aimed at nationals of
particular countries likely to share a common
religion—is properly the subject of more searching
judicial review. See id.
All told, modern judicial precedent supports the
notion that courts have both the power and the
responsibility to review Presidential Proclamation
9645. Where, as here, the Court is asked to review a
far-reaching program—promulgated at the highest
level of the Executive Branch and targeting aliens
based on nationality and religion—precedent and
common sense demand more than an assessment of
whether the government has offered a “facially
legitimate and bona fide” rationale for its policy.
Rather, this policy, both on its face and in light of the
glaring clues as to its motivations, cries out for
careful judicial scrutiny.
II.

KOREMATSU, HIRABAYASHI, AND YASUI
STAND AS STARK REMINDERS OF THE
NEED
FOR
SEARCHING
JUDICIAL
REVIEW WHEN THE GOVERNMENT
TARGETS DISFAVORED MINORITIES IN
THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

This Court need not look far for a reminder of
the constitutional costs and human suffering that
flow from the Judiciary’s failure to rein in sweeping
governmental action against disfavored minorities.
And it need not look far for a reminder of the
Executive Branch’s use of national security as a
pretext to discriminate against such groups. The
Court need look only to its own precedents—its all
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but universally condemned wartime decisions in
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.
1. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt
issued Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the
Secretary of War to designate “military areas” from
which “any or all persons” could be excluded and
“with respect to which, the right of any person to
enter, remain in, or leave” would be subject to
“whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the
appropriate Military Commander may impose.”
Exec. Order No. 9066, “Authorizing the Secretary of
War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. Reg. 1407,
1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Adding its imprimatur to the
Executive Order, Congress made violation of any
restrictions issued thereunder a federal offense. An
Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat.
173.
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the
Western Defense Command, used that authority to
issue a series of proclamations that led to the
removal and incarceration of all individuals of
Japanese ancestry living in “Military Area No. 1”—an
exclusion area covering the entire Pacific Coast.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89. A curfew order came
first. Soon after, Japanese Americans were ordered
to abandon their homes and communities on the
West Coast for tarpaper barracks (euphemistically
called “relocation centers”) surrounded by barbed
wire and machine gun towers in desolate areas
inland. Id. at 90.
For different individual reasons, but sharing a
deep sense of justice, Minoru Yasui, Gordon
Hirabayashi, and Fred Korematsu refused to comply

22
with General DeWitt’s orders.
Yasui, a young
lawyer, regarded the curfew as an affront to
American constitutional values. “To make it a crime
for me to do the same thing as any non-Japanese
person *** solely on the basis of ancestry,” he
explained, “was, in my opinion, an absolutely
abominable concept and wholly unacceptable.”
Testimony of Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress,
Japanese Am. Citizens League 9, Comm’n on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
(1981). “Our law and our basic concept of justice had
always been founded upon the fundamental principle
that no person should be punished but for that
individual’s act, and not because of one’s ancestry.”
Id. at 10. Convinced of the curfew’s illegality, Yasui
immediately defied it in order to initiate a
constitutional challenge.
Hirabayashi, a student at the University of
Washington, also defied the orders so that he could
challenge their constitutionality, saying that he
“considered it [his] duty to maintain the democratic
standards for which this nation lives.” PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 88 (1984).
Korematsu, a welder living in Oakland, CA,
refused to obey the removal orders so that he could
remain with his fiancée who was not subject to
removal because she was not Japanese American.
The last of the three to face arrest and prosecution,
Korematsu “shared with Yasui and Hirabayashi an
equal devotion to constitutional principle” and
believed that the statute under which he was
convicted was wrong. Id. at 98.

23
2. The constitutional challenges Yasui,
Hirabayashi, and Korematsu made to the military
orders soon made their way to this Court. But far
from fulfilling its essential role in the constitutional
structure that entrusts the Judiciary with the
protection of fundamental rights, the Court set upon
a path of judicial abdication that today serves as a
cautionary tale.
In Hirabayashi’s case, the Court elected to
consider only his conviction for violating the curfew
order, leaving unanswered his challenge to his
conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control
Station—a precursor to removal from his home in
Seattle. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85. Harkening
back to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court
repeated the government’s claim that “social,
economic and political conditions” “intensified the[]
solidarity” of Japanese Americans and “prevented
their assimilation as an integral part of the white
population.” Id. at 96. Betraying no skepticism of
these premises, the Court found that, in view of these
and other attributes of the “isolation” of Japanese
Americans and their “relatively little social
intercourse *** [with] the white population,”
“Congress and the Executive could reasonably have
concluded that these conditions *** encouraged the
continued attachment of members of this group to
Japan and Japanese institutions.”
Id. at 98.
“Whatever views we may entertain regarding the
loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese
ancestry,” the Court continued, “we cannot reject as
unfounded the judgment of the military authorities
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of
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that population, whose number and strength could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained.” Id. at 99.
Having upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, the
Court issued only a short opinion remanding Yasui’s
case to the Ninth Circuit. Yasui, 320 U.S. at 115.
Because the district court had imposed a sentence
based on its determination that Yasui had renounced
his American citizenship, and the government did not
defend that finding, the Court remanded the matter
for resentencing. Id. at 117. The Court thereby
avoided addressing the district court’s conclusion,
supported by extensive analysis, that the military
orders were unconstitutional as applied to citizens.
See United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 44-54 (D.
Or. 1942).
The Court’s third opportunity to confront the
mass removal and incarceration program came a
year-and-a-half later, in Korematsu’s case.
The
Court again narrowed the issues before it, rejecting
Korematsu’s argument that the removal order could
not be extricated from the incarceration he would
inevitably face if he complied with that order. 323
U.S. at 216. Then, despite affirming that racial
distinctions are “immediately suspect” and “must [be]
subject *** to the most rigid scrutiny,” id., the Court
denied, without probing examination, that the
military orders were driven by racial hostility. The
Court reiterated its conclusion from Hirabayashi that
it would not substitute its judgment for that of the
military authorities.
“There was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some,” the Court reasoned,
and “the military authorities considered that the
need for action was great, and time was short. We
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cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective
of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions
were unjustified.” Id. at 223-224.
When the Court decided Korematsu, however,
three members rejected the government’s arguments.
In vigorous dissents, Justices Murphy and Jackson
sharply questioned the validity of the military
justification the government advanced. Although
acknowledging that the discretion of those entrusted
with national security matters “must, as a matter of
*** common sense, be wide,” Justice Murphy declared
that “it is essential that there be definite limits to
military discretion” and that individuals not be “left
impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea
of military necessity that has neither substance nor
support.” 323 U.S. at 234. In his view, the exclusion
order “clearly d[id] not meet th[is] test” as it relied
“for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all
persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous
tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.” Id. at
234-235 (emphasis added).
In fact, as Justice
Murphy noted, intelligence investigations found no
evidence of Japanese American sabotage or
espionage. Id. at 241. And even if “there were some
disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific
Coast,” Justice Murphy reasoned, “to infer that
examples of individual disloyalty prove group
disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against
the entire group” is nothing more than “th[e]
legalization of racism.” Id. at 240-241, 242.
Justice Jackson was equally dubious of the
factual basis for the government’s claim that the
military orders were justified. The government never
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submitted General DeWitt’s Final Report to the lower
courts.
Although the report was eventually
presented to this Court, by then it was too late for
development of record evidence to challenge the
report or counter its assertions. Those facts were not
lost on Justice Jackson, who viewed the report with
skepticism. “How does the Court know,” he asked,
“that these orders have a reasonable basis in
necessity?” 323 U.S. at 245. Pointing out that “[n]o
evidence whatever on that subject ha[d] been taken
by this or any other court” and that the Final Report
was the subject of “sharp controversy as to [its]
credibility,” Justice Jackson observed that the Court
had “no real evidence before it” and thus “ha[d] no
choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn,
self-serving statement, untested by any crossexamination, that what he did was reasonable.” Id.
Justice Jackson saw grave dangers in the
Court’s opinion. While an unconstitutional military
order is short-lived, he observed, “once a judicial
opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes
the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in
criminal procedure and of transplanting American
citizens.” 323 U.S. at 246. With that, Justice
Jackson issued a prophetic warning: By “validat[ing]
the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure and of transplanting American citizens,”
the Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the
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hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id. 2
3. The dissenters’ fears proved to be wellfounded. Decades after this Court’s decisions in
Hirabayashi,
Yasui,
and
Korematsu,
newly
discovered government records revealed not only that
intelligence reports and data contradicted the claim
that the mass removal and incarceration program
was justified by military necessity, but also that the
government knew as much when it convinced the
Court to affirm the defendants’ convictions. 3
In 1983, armed with those newly discovered
records, Yasui, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu filed
Justice Jackson’s usage of Korematsu and Hirabayashi as
precedent in Harisiades (see p. 16, supra), on which the
government relies (Gov’t Br. 18), brought this warning to life.
In Harisiades, a noncitizen claimed that due process protected
his liberties in the same way it does the rights of citizens. But
Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Justice Jackson wrote, show that
even citizens are unprotected from far-reaching government
claims of national security. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591 & n.17
(“When citizens raised the Constitution as a shield against
expulsion from their homes and places of business, the Court
refused to find hardship a cause for judicial intervention.”).
Constrained by stare decisis, Justice Jackson applied Korematsu
as standing precedent to reject Harisiades’ constitutional claim.
That application to the specific facts in Harisiades extended
Korematsu’s principle of extreme deference to “new purposes”—
precisely the danger Justice Jackson predicted in his “loaded
weapon” warning. 323 U.S. at 246.
3 Those records are discussed at length in Justice at War: The
Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases by Peter
Irons, supra, who, along with Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, unearthed
them.
2
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coram nobis petitions seeking to vacate their
convictions. As the court found in the Hirabayashi
case, government records showed that General
DeWitt’s Final Report had been materially altered in
order to fabricate an acceptable factual justification
for the mass removal and incarceration program.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445,
1456-1457 (W.D. Wash. 1986). Although the version
of the report presented to this Court stated that it
was impossible to identify potentially disloyal
Japanese Americans in the time available, a prior
printed version—submitted to the War Department
while the government’s briefs in Hirabayashi and
Yasui were being finalized—made clear that the
decision to issue the challenged orders had nothing to
do with urgency. Rather, General Dewitt’s decision
turned on his view that Japanese Americans were
inherently disloyal on account of their “ties of race,
intense feeling of filial piety and *** strong bonds of
common tradition, culture and customs.” Id. at 1449.
“It was not that there was insufficient time in which
to make such a determination” the original report
stated; “a positive determination could not be made
[because] an exact separation of the ‘sheep and the
goats’ was unfeasible.”
Id. (quoting Lieutenant
General John L. DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese
Evacuation from the West Coast ch. 2 (1942)).
Beyond exposing the racist underpinnings of
General DeWitt’s orders (as well as the pretextual
nature of the claim of urgency), the coram nobis cases
revealed that the government possessed information
rebutting the assertion in the DeWitt Report that
Japanese Americans were involved in sabotage and
espionage. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d
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591, 601 (9th Cir. 1987). The Office of Naval
Intelligence (“ONI”), which the President charged
with monitoring West Coast Japanese American
communities, had determined in its official report
that Japanese Americans were overwhelmingly loyal
and posed no security risk. ONI thus recommended
handling any potential disloyalty on an individual,
not group, basis. ONI found, contrary to the
government’s representation to this Court, that mass
incarceration was unnecessary, as “individual
determinations could be made expeditiously.” Id. at
602 n.11 (emphasis added); see also IRONS, supra, at
203. In addition, reports from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) and Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) directly refuted claims in the
DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were
engaged in shore-to-ship signaling, intimating
Japanese American espionage. Korematsu, 584 F.
Supp. at 1417. Indeed, FBI Director Hoover wrote to
Attorney General Biddle shortly before President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 that the push
for mass racial handling was based on politics rather
than facts. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir.
FBI to Francis Biddle, Att’y Gen. (Feb. 2, 1942).
Department of Justice attorney John Burling,
co-author of the government’s brief, sought to alert
the Court of the FBI and FCC intelligence that
directly refuted the DeWitt Report. Burling included
in his brief a crucial footnote that read: “The recital
[in General DeWitt’s report] of the circumstances
justifying the evacuation as a matter of military
necessity *** is in several respects, particularly with
reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and
to shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese

30
ancestry, in conflict with information in the
possession of the Department of Justice.” Korematsu,
584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis and citation omitted).
But high-level Justice Department lawyers stopped
the brief’s printing. Despite Burling’s vociferous
protest about the DeWitt Report’s “intentional
falsehoods,” id. at 1418, the footnote was diluted to
near incoherence, even implying the opposite of
Burling’s intended message. As revised, the footnote
stated:
[The DeWitt Report] is relied on in this
brief for statistics and other details
concerning the actual evacuation and the
events that took place subsequent thereto.
We have specifically recited in this brief the
facts relating to the justification for the
evacuation, of which we ask the Court to
take judicial notice, and we rely upon the
Final Report only to the extent that it
relates to such facts.
Gov’t Br. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1944). Notwithstanding an earlier
warning from Justice Department lawyer Edward
Ennis that failing to alert the Court to the contrary
intelligence in DOJ’s possession “might approximate
the suppression of evidence,” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d
at 602 n.11 (citation omitted), the Justice
Department concealed from the Court this material
evidence on military necessity.
In light of the evidence presented, the courts
hearing Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi’s
coram nobis cases concluded that the government’s
misconduct had effected “a manifest injustice” and
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that the mass removal and incarceration program
had been validated based on unfounded charges of
treason. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417;
Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1447. 4 In granting
Korematsu’s coram nobis petition, Judge Patel
articulated the modern significance of the wartime
cases:
Korematsu *** stands as a constant caution
that in times of war or declared military
necessity our institutions must be vigilant
in protecting constitutional guarantees. It
stands as a caution that in times of distress
the shield of military necessity and
national security must not be used to
protect governmental actions from close
scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a
caution that in times of international
hostility and antagonisms our institutions,
legislative, executive and judicial, must be
prepared to exercise their authority to
protect all citizens from the petty fears and
prejudices that are so easily aroused.
Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
In
vacating
Korematsu,
Yasui,
and
Hirabayashi’s convictions, the coram nobis courts
joined other governmental institutions in recognizing
In Minoru Yasui’s coram nobis case, the court acceded to the
government’s request to vacate his conviction and dismiss his
petition for relief without making any determinations regarding
government misconduct—and without acknowledging the
injustice he suffered.

4

32
the wrongs committed against Japanese Americans
during World War II. In 1976, President Ford
officially rescinded Executive Order 9066, explaining
that “[w]e now know what we should have known
then—not only was *** evacuation wrong, but
Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.”
Presidential Proclamation 4417, “An American
Promise,” 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976). The
Executive Branch also recognized the contributions of
the three men who challenged the military orders.
Each one received the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor: Fred
Korematsu in 1998, Gordon Hirabayashi in 2012, and
Minoru Yasui in 2015.
In 1983, after extensive hearings and research,
the congressionally authorized Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
(CWRIC) issued a report concluding that it was not
“military necessity” that underpinned the mass
removal and incarceration program, but rather “race
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political
leadership.” REPORT OF CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED 459 (The Civil Liberties Public Education
Fund & University of Washington Press, 1997). Five
years later, Congress passed (and President Reagan
signed) the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which, on the
CWRIC’s recommendations, acknowledged the
injustice of the removal and incarceration program,
issued an official apology, and conferred symbolic
reparations to the survivors of the incarceration
centers.
Most recently, in 2011, the Acting Solicitor
General confirmed what the coram nobis cases had
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established decades earlier: This Court’s wartime
decisions were predicated on lies. “By the time the
cases of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu
reached the Supreme Court, [DOJ] had learned of a
key intelligence report that undermined the rationale
behind the internment. *** But the Solicitor General
did not inform the Court of the report despite
warnings *** that failing to alert the Court ‘might
approximate the suppression of evidence.’ Instead,
he argued that it was impossible to segregate loyal
Japanese Americans from disloyal ones.” U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Confession of Error:
The Solicitor
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American
Internment
Cases
(May
20,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-errorsolicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japaneseamerican-internment-cases.
III. THE
GOVERNMENT’S
LITIGATION
STRATEGY IN THIS CASE DEMANDS
THIS COURT’S VIGILANCE.
The government’s arguments in this case bear a
disturbing similarity to the arguments this Court
accepted in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.
Defending the military orders in Hirabayashi, the
government told this Court:
The classification was not based upon
invidious race discrimination. Rather, it
was founded upon the fact that the group
as a whole contained an unknown
number of persons who could not readily
be singled out and who were a threat to
the security of the nation; and in order to
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impose effective restraints upon them it
was necessary not only to deal with the
entire group, but to deal with it at once.
Certainly, it cannot be said that such a
conclusion was beyond the honest
judgment, reasonably exercised, of those
whose duty it was to protect the Pacific
Coast against attack.
Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, supra
(emphasis added).
Here, the government similarly implores the
Court to accept the rationale offered and not to look
behind the four corners of the Presidential
Proclamation to ascertain whether the policy is
motivated by discriminatory animus.
“The
Proclamation,” the government argues, “is explicitly
premised on facially legitimate purposes: protecting
national security and the national interest by
preventing entry of persons about whom the United
States lacks sufficient information to assess the risk
they pose[.] *** The Proclamation thus amply
establishes a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide
reason’ for its restrictions.’” Gov’t Br. 60 (quoting
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770).
Decades after Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and
Yasui, however, the national security justification
the government offered for its wartime policies was
proven false and the real reasons for the military
orders—baseless concerns about disloyalty grounded
in racial stereotypes—were exposed.
The
government has offered no basis to believe that
similar revelations about the President’s decision to
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exclude individuals from Muslim-majority countries
will not one day come to light. To the contrary, the
government’s representations and litigation strategy
in this case only exacerbate that grave concern.
First, although the government claims that it
conducted a “worldwide review” to arrive at the
decision to deny all immigrant and most nonimmigrant visas to designated classes, the
Proclamation’s text offers reason to doubt that the
review actually supports the policy.
The
Proclamation indicates that its non-immigrant visa
restrictions
are
“in
accordance
with
the
recommendations of the Secretary of Homeland
Security” based on the worldwide review.
Presidential Proclamation, § 1(h)(iii). Notably, the
Proclamation does not make the same claim with
respect to the immigrant visa restrictions. See id. at
§ 1(h)(ii).
The government’s references to the
worldwide review in its brief are similarly delicate.
See Gov’t Br. 9-10.
Second, despite the purported centrality of the
worldwide review and corresponding report by the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the government has
gone to great lengths to shield that report from view.
The government has resisted providing the report to
the courts even for in camera inspection and has
urged the courts not to “consider [its] contents”
should they decide, over the government’s objections,
to review the report. See Notice of In Camera Ex
Parte Lodging of Report Containing Classified
Information
and
Objection
to
Review
or
Consideration of Report at 4, State of Hawaii v.
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Trump et al., No. 17-cv-0050-DKW-KSC, ECF No.
376 (D. Haw. Oct. 13, 2017); Fourth Circuit Letter,
supra. The government has also aggressively fought
efforts to release the report publicly, arguing that it
is protected from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) by the presidential
communications privilege. See, e.g., Brennan Center
for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 2, 2017). 5
Third, echoing the findings in the ONI, FBI and
FCC reports suppressed in the wartime cases, the
limited documents that have come to light pertaining
to the President’s exclusion decision undermine
rather than affirm the purported national security
justification for the ban.
Following the first
Executive Order suspending the entry of aliens from
Muslim-majority nations, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) drafted a report
assessing the likelihood that visitors and immigrants
from those countries would commit acts of terrorism
in the United States. The report concluded that
“citizens of countries affected by E.O. 13769 [were]
In FOIA litigation, the government has released indexes
describing the contents of the pages it continues to withhold.
Those indexes indicate that the appendices for the reports on
the “worldwide” review are only a few pages long. See Letter to
Judge Paul Gardephe from AUSA Christopher Connolly,
Brennan Center for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2018), ECF No. 31. Because the reports’
appendices supposedly provide detail as to why the targeted
countries’ vetting systems are inadequate, the paltry page count
offers additional reason for skepticism that the reports provide a
sufficient justification for the President’s policy.
5
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rarely implicated in US-based terrorism” and “few of
the impacted countries have terrorist groups that
threaten the West.” Acting Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis, DHS, Citizenship Likely an Unreliable
Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States
(Feb.
2017)
(capitalization
removed),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730
/DHS-intelligence-document-on-PresidentDonald.pdf. In other words, little more than six
months before the Secretary of Homeland Security
produced a report that purports to justify the visadenial policy, the Department concluded that the
very individuals affected were unlikely to pose a
threat to the United States if permitted to enter.
Parallels to the government’s actions in the
wartime cases have not been lost on the lower courts.
Before enjoining the President’s Proclamation, the
District Court of Maryland asked the government:
“How is this different than Korematsu where [the
United States] relied on an executive order by the
President and many years after the fact it was
determined that there was information within the
Justice
Department
that
contradicted
representations made to the Court”? Prelim. Inj.
Hr’g Tr. at 50, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, et al.
v. Trump, et al., No. 17-cv-00361-TDC (D. Md. Oct.
16, 2017), ECF No. 217. Even when confronted with
that direct question, the government refused to
assure the court that the DHS report entirely
supports the policies contained in the Proclamation.
See id. at 51 (“Your Honor, I’m not going to speak to
the contents of the report.”). Indeed, the government
disclaimed any obligation to tell the court whether
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advisors to the President disagreed that his
exclusion decision was necessary. See id. at 52 (“I do
not think we either have the obligation or should be
asked about whether there were disagreements
among presidential advisors in the report and
whether—what one describes as an inconsistency of
what one agency thought or what another agency
thought.”).
The government’s refusal to produce the report
underlying the Proclamation, or even to assure the
courts that its contents do not undermine the
President’s policy, offers ample reason for skepticism
that the decision to exclude certain classes was based
on a credible assessment of the national security
threat those individuals pose. The dubious nature of
the government’s asserted justification raises the
question whether, like in Korematsu, Hirabayashi,
and Yasui, the decision was motivated by more
nefarious considerations.
*

*

*

During World War II, this Court’s refusal to
probe the government’s claim that military necessity
justified the mass removal and incarceration of
Japanese Americans made it unwittingly complicit in
the government’s deception. The Court’s blank-check
treatment of the Executive Branch’s wartime
policies—underscored by its repeated refusal to
confront the most grievous aspects of those policies or
to acknowledge their racist underpinnings—allowed
the wrongs inflicted on Japanese Americans to
continue unabated for years, and allowed the

39
government to avoid accountability for its egregious
misconduct for decades.
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are
powerful reminders not only of the need for constant
vigilance in protecting our fundamental values, but
also of the essential role of the courts as a check on
abuses of government power, especially during times
of national and international stress. Rather than
repeat the failures of the past, this Court should
repudiate them and affirm the greater legacy of those
cases: Blind deference to the Executive Branch, even
in areas in which decision-makers must wield wide
discretion, is incompatible with the protection of
fundamental freedoms. Meaningful judicial review is
an essential element of a healthy democracy.
Consistent with those principles, this Court
should reject the government’s invitation to abdicate
its critical role in our constitutional system, subject
the President’s exclusion decision to searching
judicial scrutiny, and stand—as Gordon Hirabayashi,
Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu did—as a
bulwark
against
governmental
action
that
undermines core constitutional values.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
affirm the decisions below.
Respectfully submitted.
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